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Are Trade Unions and Their
Members “Populist”?
Les syndicats et leurs membres sont-ils « populistes » ?
¿Son los sindicatos y sus miembros "populistas"?
Nelson Lichtenstein
1 Early in the second decade of the 21st century, shortly after the emergence of the Tea
Party  phenomenon but  just  before  the  Occupy Wall  Street  movement,  hundreds  of
blue-collar workers, mainly white, mainly male, mostly small-town, and all very angry,
had a dramatic standoff with two of the biggest and most aggressive foreign-owned
corporations on the planet. The workers were defending a multigenerational way of life
that was threatened by a pair of global corporations intent on slashing wages, cutting
pensions, and turning a set of skilled occupations into something far more tenuous and
contingent. 
2 In  Longview,  Washington,  hundreds  of  workers  blocked  train  tracks  and  stormed
portside  loading  docks  to  keep  EGT,  an  East  Asian  logistics  consortium,  from
outsourcing  their  jobs  to  a  cheaper  set  of  workers  made  desperate  by  a  Pacific
Northwest  economy that had bled logging,  manufacturing,  and transport  jobs for a
generation. Until the police stopped their rampage, they used baseball bats to smash
windows, damage rail cars, and dump tons of grain onto the ground. More than a dozen
were arrested (Greenhouse S., 2011: B2). Meanwhile in Boron, California, deep in the
heart of  conservative Kern County,  scores of  beefy miners confronted Rico Tinto,  a
giant British-Australian combine that was determined to slash labor costs in a small,
isolated Mojave Desert  town where open pit  mining of  “Twenty Mule Team Borax”
fame was the only game in town. “We’re standing up for our community and for every
working family in America,” was the way most these heavy equipment operators saw
their fight1. 
3 Angry white male workers fearful for their jobs; small towns turned upside down by
global  economic  forces.  Surely  all  this  proved  a  breeding  ground  for  populist
resentment,  xenophobic  outrage,  and  blue-collar  support  for  the  kind  of  political
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tribune who could promise to “Make America Great Again.” And indeed, both of these
protests took place in “red” counties that would later vote heavily for Donald Trump in
the 2016 elections. 2
4 But no. These blue-collar men, and a few women, were all members of the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union, a West Coast labor organization that would endorse
Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primaries. No reporter or pundit thought to
label  these  strikers  “populist”  even  at  the  very  height  of  their  confrontation  with
multinational capital, which took place in 2010 and 2011 when Tea Party outrage was
on the upswing. They were unionists and militants who had the moral and financial
support  of  the  rest  of  the  labor  movement.  They  confronted  a  set  of  corporate
opponents  in  a  highly  programmatic  fashion.  They  were  not  alienated,  but  found
solidarity and friendship in their struggle. 
5 The same was true of the upsurges that swept several red states in 2018 when school
teachers  stopped  work  and  descended  upon  the  state  capitals  in  West  Virginia,
Oklahoma,  and  Arizona,  even  as  smaller  protests  stirred  the  political  waters  in
Kentucky,  North  Carolina,  and  Colorado.  While  these  strikes  were  non-violent  and
heavily female in composition, they were hardly genteel. Almost all were “a brazen act
of  mass  civil  disobedience,”  because  red  state  politicians  had  made  such  public
employee work stoppages illegal (Bryant J. 2018; Blanc E., 2019). These protests, all of
which demanded higher taxes on the corporations and the rich to channel more money
for the public schools, were climaxed by the massive, community-backed Los Angeles
teacher’s  strike  of  January  2019  which  directed  much  anger  at  the  billionaire
philanthropists  and financiers  who backed an expansion of  charter  schools,  fought
unionization  in  public  education  and  elsewhere,  and  had  poured  millions  into
California school board races to boost candidates with similar ideas (Lichtenstein N.,
2018; Sonti S., 2019). 
6 To call these strikers, blue-collar or white, populists is to saddle them with a label that
does  grave  injustice.  This  essay  argues  that  trade  unionism  in  the  United  States
constitutes a very different phenomenon from the social and political movements we
today call “populist.” Although their demographic composition is often similar, labor
organizations emphasize social solidarity, programmatic coherence, and organizational
longevity. In contrast, the contemporary populist insurgencies of our era, both left and
right,  are far more episodic in their appearance,  are composed of  individuals often
alienated and atomistic in their approach to politics, and leave behind few institutions
capable of functioning on a permanent basis after the fervor of the campaign season
fades away. 
7 Contemporary confusion over the meaning of  the populist  idea therefore reflects  a
failure of analytic observation. To most pundits and politicians deployment of the term
“populist” has become highly problematic because it has become a default phase for
various forms of social  or political  insurgency,  with an ideological  content that too
often lies in the eye of the beholder. As John Judis put it in a recent intervention, “As
with ordinary language, even more so with ordinary political language, the different
people and parties called “populist” enjoy family resemblances of one to the other, but
not a set of traits can be found exclusively in all of them” (Judis J., 2016: 13-14). 
8 This was not always so. In the 1890s when the Populist Party rose to prominence in the
U.S., these workers, farmers, and radical intellectuals put forward a coherent and far-
reaching program that echoed down the 20th century decades. The Populists wanted
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electoral reforms to squeeze corruption out of politics, pushed for progressive taxation
of income, demanded public control of banking, railroads, and utilities, favored silver
over gold in order to expand and cheapen credit, and fought for more public schools
and colleges. They were not hayseeds. Nor were they remembered as such. In 1962 for
example, the New York Times headlined a liberal congressional effort to defeat A.T.& T.
and keep satellite communications in public hands. “Space Age Populists: Senate Test
Today on Satellite Bill Recalls Political Fires of the 1890s.” (Philipps C., 1962). In this
anti-monopoly effort, contemporary progressives saw the Populists as part of a long
and  respectable  lineage  stretching  back  to  the  Jacksonians,  the  Mugwumps,  the
Progressives,  the  New  Dealers,  and  the  Paul  Douglas/Wayne  Morse/Estes  Kefauver
liberals of the 1950s. 
9 Populism  got  a  sour,  illiberal  rewrite  when  postwar  intellectuals  like  Richard
Hofstadter,  Seymour  Martin  Lipset,  and  Daniel  Bell  entered  the  historical  and
sociological fray. As part of the generation who had witnessed the rise of Stalin and
Hitler, these ex-radicals thought they saw in the mass following of Joe McCarthy the
kind of authoritarian mobilization that had led to catastrophe in Europe and elsewhere.
Since  McCarthy  came  from  Wisconsin,  and  made  a  regular  habit  of  denouncing
Washington civil servants, liberal academics, and moderate Republicans, Hofstadter et
al.  explained  McCarthyism  as  a  kind  of  revolt  against  modernity,  a  pseudo-
conservatism that traced its roots back to a Populist movement seeking to recapture an
agrarian and small town past forever lost in the 20th century. In this reading of their
history,  Populist  mythology  celebrated  virtuous  farmers  at  the  expense  of  urban
sophisticates,  found  financial  conspiracies  responsible  for  the  business  cycle,  and
traded in anti-Semitic  stereotypes and innuendo (Bell  D.,  1964;  Hofstadter  R.,  1955,
1963). 
10 But Hofstadter and the rest of the New York intellectuals were wrong about the original
Populists. As early as 1963 historian Walter Nugent published a refutation, The Tolerant
Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativism, an assessment sustained by scores of other
historians, including Charles Postel, whose The Populist Vision won the Bancroft Prize
in 2008. Meanwhile, in 1967 political scientist Michael Rogin demolished the idea of a
generational or demographic linkage between the Populists, illiberal or otherwise, and
the  followers  of  Joe  McCarthy.  In  his  The  Intellectuals  and  McCarthy:  The  Radical
Specter, Rogin found that the McCarthyites in the 1950s Midwest were far more closely
associated with traditional Republican conservatism than with any authoritarianism
arising out of plebian angst (Nugent W., 1963; Postel C., 2007; Rogin M., 1967).
11 But none of this scholarship could dent the evocative framing that took hold in the
1960s and after.  The actual Populists of the 1890s, with their well-defined program,
their own political  party,  their affinity for organized labor,  and their rootedness in
clearly-defined  communities,  has  been  forgotten  except  by  academic  specialists.
Instead, the word populist, following from the work of Bell, Lipset, and Hofstadter, has
been applied toward those movements that have arisen as an unstable, often irrational
hostility toward an ill-defined elite. George Wallace seemed an early embodiment of the
kind of  demagogic  candidates  for  high  office  who took  advantage  of  this  strain  in
American politics (Kazin M., 1995 : 221-244). Over the next half century the populist
moniker became a shape shifting category, often an explanatory phrase deployed by
journalists to describe the appeal and the following of almost any rightwing politician
defaming  liberal  elites,  but  also  applied  at  various  times  to  those  on  the  left  who
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supported Jimmy Carter, Jim Hightower, Jerry Brown, and Howard Dean. And the Texas
billionaire Ross Perot had the populist label applied to him as well (Denison D., 1992). 
12 To the extent that there is a cultural or educational elite, populists resent them; indeed,
all  those  of  a  cosmopolitan,  bi-coastal  outlook,  notwithstanding  the  many
conservatives who also fill this sociocultural niche. But even more important than the
cultural posture or economic program held by those labeled contemporary populists, is
another  feature  of  their  politics:  the  atomization  and  anti-institutionalism of  their
struggle, a condition that sometimes applies as much to those on the left as on the
right. Almost by definition, populists are unorganized in any meaningful sense. They do
not function through and with an institution, except perhaps via intense engagement
in partisan politics at the height of the campaign season. Mass rallies offer an emotive
substitute for substantive political organization and engagement. This kind of populism
is therefore the label attached to protest sentiment unmoored by institutional loyalties
(Goldberg  J.,  2015;  Bonikowski  B.,  and  Gidron  N.,  2016)  .  And  such  populism  is  by
common if unstated agreement, exclusively white. Thus, on the left, neither Black Lives
Matter nor the Latino protests of a few years ago, “A Day Without Immigrants” are
thought to be populist,  while Occupy Wall Street and the Bernie Sanders campaign,
both predominately white, are offered this label. On the Right, virtually all political
activity  is  white.  But  significantly,  neither  the  hyper-organized  National  Rifle
Association,  nor  the  equally  well-structured  Focus  on  the  Family  and  the  more
politically  active  evangelical  churches  are  normally  -  or  rightfully  -  thought to  be
“populist.”
13 Jan-Werner Muller, one of the foremost students of modern populism, argues that a
criticism of elites, global or local, is not the defining feature of the populism that has
swept Europe and North America in recent years.  Such a critique has been part  of
democratic discourse for centuries. Rather Muller argues, populists are distinctive –
and dangerous – because the crucial feature of modern populism is that those who see
themselves as part of this movement claim that they – and only they – represent “the
real people,” aka the “silent majority,” or a volk whose authenticity is defined in barely
veiled  racial  or  ethnic  terms.  What  matters  about  populism  is  its  moralistic  anti-
pluralism, writes Muller, because such a posture excludes from the definition of “the
real people” a set of marginalized others toward which anger and distain are directed
(Muller J.-W., 2018 : 196-197). To Muller “populists portray their political competitors
as part of the immoral, corrupt elite,” which he claims is “another way of saying that
populism is always a form of identity politics” (Muller J.-W., 2017: 3).” 
14 Muller, who has long focused his scholarship on central Europe, is properly sensitive to
the authoritarian and anti-democratic  character  of  a  mass movement that  seeks to
demonize its opponents. Such hostility to political and cultural pluralism has generated
historical catastrophes well known to the 20th century. But anti-elitism does not have
to be culturally or ideologically authoritarian nor does identity politics always have
negative consequences. Socialism’s animating character, likewise that of militant trade
unionism,  has  been  the  identification  of  and  contestation  with  an  economic  and
political elite whose immorality is juxtaposed to that of the virtuous and industrious
mass below. As one stanza of “Solidarity Forever,” the union anthem puts it:
15 All the world that's owned by idle drones is ours and ours alone.
We have laid the wide foundations; built it skyward stone by stone.
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It is ours, not to slave in, but to master and to own.
While the union makes us strong.3
16 The key issue here is not labor’s moralism, but rather its organizational form and ethos.
It is the union, not the charismatic leader, that “makes us strong.” And despite the
routine demagoguery that labels trade union leaders as “bosses,” the fact is that unions
are one of the more democratic institutions in American society, certainly more so than
the  modern  political  campaign,  which  has  become  a  form  of  entrepreneurial  self-
advancement, displacing the political party, and then dismantling itself immediately
after an election once its capacity to generate money, mobilize partisans, and evoke the
imagery of a social movement is no longer needed. Indeed, this was the fate of two of
the most inspiring and successful campaigns of recent years. Despite all the plans and
determination to build a post-election infrastructure, neither the campaigns of Obama
in 2008 nor Sanders in 2016 were able to sustain much of an organization independent
of the candidate and viable in its own right (Brown D., 2012: 16; Dovere E.-I, 2018). 
17 With all this in mind, let’s return to those labor protests for a moment. At Longview
and Boron, the striking workers were organized, not merely in a legal or economic
sense,  but  on  a  trajectory  that  extended  from  the  social  and  ideological  to  the
profoundly emotive and personal. Although in each case a powerful corporation was
the aggressor, the workers were not mere victims, but combatants, empowered by their
friendships, their local union, the larger ILWU, and supporters across the country and
even abroad. Rico Tinto locked out hundreds of these unionists and replaced them with
others, often less skilled, who were glad to find almost any job. But unlike so many
others, then and now, who found their jobs stolen or abolished by global production
shifts, these Boron workers were not alone. They had prepared for the lockout in a
collective  fashion,  with  meetings,  strategy  sessions,  and  on-the-job  slowdowns  and
stoppages.  The ILWU sent in food caravans,  organized demonstrations,  and enlisted
friendly  politicians  to  put  pressure  on  Rico  Tinto.  They  attended  rallies  in  which
prominent labor leaders attacked the global elite, but these workers could also speak
for themselves. Their fight was in the news on almost a daily basis and they had their
own  trusted  spokesmen  and  women  who  put  forth  an  ideologically  and  political
coherent defense of their cause (Olney P., 2011). 
18 At Boron the ILWU won, maintaining key seniority rights, wage standards, and union
strength;  at  Longview  the  union  reached  a  far  less  satisfactory  agreement.  But
regardless of the outcome, we can see why “populist” would indeed serve as such a
poor  label  if  applied  to  their  struggle.  Many  of  the  workers,  especially  in  heavily
Mormon Boron, were Republicans, later Trump Republicans,4 but their anti-corporate
fight  was  of  a  far  more  concrete,  programmatic,  and  efficacious  sort  than  that
rhetorically  offered  by  the  politicians  labeled  populist  during  the  2016  campaign
season. 
19 This same dichotomy would appear during the teacher strikes of 2018 and 2019. Liberal
politicians  of  every  sort,  including  presidential  aspirants  Bernie  Sanders,  Elizabeth
Warren,  and  Kamala  Harris,  and  leading  Congressional  liberals  Alexandria  Ocasio-
Cortez,  Ted  Lieu,  and Adam Schiff  rushed  to  offer  support,  but  while  these  office-
holders are sometimes labeled populists  or their  programs populist,  few pundits  or
journalists made the mistake of labelling the school teachers themselves “populists”.5
Their movement was too programmatic, too rooted in community, and too genuinely
democratic for that label to apply.6
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20 This  distinction  between  populism  and  the  union  impulse  can  also  be  found  in
American  journalism.  Although  causality  cannot  be  proved,  the  deployment  of  the
words  “organized  labor”  and  “populism”  in  print  media  usage  has  been  inversely
linked during the last hundred and fifty years. In The New York Times, for example,
reporters rarely used the word populist or populism during the era, 1910 through 1970,
when the trade union idea was ascendant or when those institutions wielded great
economic power. But as the unions declined and ceased to poise even much of a verbal
challenge to existing corporate or governmental elites, populism rose to prominence as
a descriptive label for working class or insurgent sentiment. By the year 2015 the word
“populism”  was  used  twice  as  much  as  the  phrase  “organized  labor,”  an  absolute
reversal of the relationship 30 and more years before. 7
21 Although a world of political, cultural, and moral difference divided Donald Trump and
his supporters from the movement engendered by Bernie Sanders, the two did have
this in common: during the 2016 campaign season both appealed to an alienated mass
of white men and women who had little direct contact with organized politics or self-
conscious  interest  groups.  In  both  instances  the  enemy was  a  distant  elite,  in  one
instance the “billionaire class,” in another craven Washington politicians or foreign
trading powers. Trump’s dystopian and conspiratorial world view, as well as that of his
supporters, has been much debated, but for the purposes of this essay, an examination
of left-wing populism might well be more important. 
22 The  21st  century  populist  revival  tracks  well  to  the  right,  but  there  are  leftwing
variants  as  well,  in  the  U.S.  most  notably  Occupy Wall  Street  and the  2016  Bernie
Sanders campaign. Both are properly labeled “populist.” The Sanders achievement was
remarkable, perhaps even unprecedented in American presidential politics. Starting as
a mere protest candidate, the Sanders candidacy quickly transcended the marginality
into which it  had been cast by all  credentialed observers.  Not only did he best the
Clinton establishment machine in 22 states and win just over 45% of all Democratic
Party primary votes  cast  in  the Winter  and Spring of  2016, but  Sanders  won more
support than Clinton from down scale Democrats, an especially amazing development
when one considers that most African-Americans,  who broke decisively for Clinton,
have incomes lower than the norm among Democratic Primary voters. His voters were
also of a lower income than those of Trump (Silver N., 2016). Unlike the higher income,
white liberal “wine track” insurgents like Howard Dean in 2004, Bill Bradley in 2000,
Edward Kennedy in  1980,  and even Barack Obama in  2008,  Sanders  captured,  on a
decidedly leftwing program, more white working-class votes than the woman who had
long been anointed by virtually every Democratic Party leader and institution as their
presumptive presidential candidate. His campaign built a mass constituency, pushed
Hillary Clinton to the left, and energized a new generation of young voters.
23 But what was the content of his program and did it have a populist appeal? Sanders
called himself a socialist and argued for a “political revolution.” The fact that millions
of people were willing to vote for a self-described socialist generations after Eugene V.
Debs and Norman Thomas campaigned for the presidency is a remarkable testimony to
the fading away of  an older,  Cold War inspired,  taboo.  And the deployment of  the
phrase  “political  revolution,”  offers  a  bracing  contrast  to  Barrack  Obama’s  flaccid
invocation of the word “change” in the 2008 campaign. But regardless of such linguistic
labeling, what in fact was the political content of this Sanders’ populism?
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24 Bernie Sanders has, of course, identified himself as a democratic socialist for decades,
and so too do many of those who have become his partisans in recent years. But such a
label does not necessarily tell us all that much about the actual content of his politics or
the structure of his movement. The meaning of the word socialism has morphed and
evolved in countless ways during the last century, so it would be churlish to measure
Sanders against an abstract and a-historical standard and thereby declare his program
timid and misplaced. But compared to the old 1890s Populists, Sanders is not all that
much of a radical. He favors a more progressive income tax, a $15 minimum wage, and
a restoration of the Glass-Steagall Act which proscribed putting under the same roof
investment and commercial banking. He does not favor nationalization of the banks or
utilities, which was central to the Populist Omaha Platform of 1892.
25 One of the most notable characteristics of the Sanders campaign, in 2016 and 2020, has
been its capacity to generate huge amounts of money from hundreds of thousands of
contributors who offer small-dollar donations. And many of these partisans have joined
house  parties  and other  organizations,  including the  rapidly  expanding Democratic
Socialists of America, to build something approaching a permanent fraction within the
larger Democratic Party. But the extent to which such a quasi-organization will outlive
the campaign is problematic. Sanders’ post-2016 political organization, Our Revolution,
proved anemic, likewise other efforts to institutionalize the energy engendered by the
Sanders electoral effort (Dovere E-I, 2018; Jones S., 2018). In this respect the Sanders
campaign resembles less the Populist Party of the 1890s or the Socialist Party a decade
later, than the episodic and impermeant populist insurgencies of more recent decades. 
26 And then there is the Sanders analysis of the problem facing contemporary America, a
viewpoint not only now virtually universal on the liberal/left but shared by some right-
wing populists as well. This is economic inequality as the root cause of our difficulties,
an outlook ratified in the most rigorous fashion by Thomas Pikertty’s multi-century
study, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. This attack on wealth and income inequality
has a specific phrasing: it is the 1% versus the rest of us, the 99%, a dichotomy first
made potent by the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 and 2012. Sanders supported
those occupations of urban parks, university campuses, and other public spaces; and
many Occupiers were among the first volunteers joining the Sanders campaign for the
Democratic Party nomination. Indeed, it is a tribute to the programmatic coherence of
his campaign, in stark and salutary contrast to the studied refusal of the Occupiers to
prioritize or even enunciate their politico-economic demands, that explains some of
the great success enjoyed by Sanders in the first half of 2016. 
27 As Sanders put it in a June 2016 Boston Globe OP-ED, “Today, 99 percent of all new
income is going to the top 1 percent, while the top one-tenth of 1 percent own almost
as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent.  It  is  time to say loudly and clearly that
corporate greed and the war against the American middle class must end. Enough is
enough!”  To  ameliorate  such  inequality,  Sanders  would  tax  the  rich,  curb  Citizens
United,  which  allowed  the  wealthy  to  make  unlimited  and  anonymous  campaign
contributions, break up the big banks, and double the minimum wage to $15 an hour. 
28 Unfortunately, the “We are the 99%!” rally cry obscures and confuses far more than it
illuminates. It offers an ineffectual strategy for building the kind of movement that
Sanders and his supporters hope to construct. Discourse centering upon the 99% has far
more of  a  populist  than a  social  democratic  or  trade  union flavor.  The problem is
threefold: first, who are the 99% and are they likely to have anything in common with
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each other? Individuals making less than $480,930 in 2016 were part of the 99% and so
too  are  those  on  food  stamps.8 They  don’t  have  much  in  common;  indeed,  their
interests are likely to be in opposition. Nor does it help all that much to conflate the
99% with the “middle class” whose upper reaches would thereby extend well into the
ranks of  elite  professionals  and various managers.  To champion the 99% is  to  seek
agency where none can be found. This is not a social category that can be mobilized. It
is a statistical construct. One does not have to be a Marxist to recognize that class is not
defined by income, consumption, or even education, but by the power and autonomy –
or the lack thereof – which people who sell their labor for their wages experience in
daily life. Most members of what we, today, call the middle class do that as well. 
29 Second, when we focus on this overbroad definition of a middle class as an object of
concern, we are necessarily marginalizing, neglecting, and denigrating those who fall
below it: those out of the workforce, those chronically unemployed, those on welfare,
those whose aspirations are not middle class at all. As Michael Zweig has pointed out in
The  Working  Class  Majority:  America’s  Best  Kept  Secret,  when  the  working  class
disappears into an amorphous middle class, the working poor – a mere forty-six million
strong  –  drops  out  of  the  picture.  From  Nixon  to  Trump,  the  American  right  has
championed the middle class,  often given a political  twist  by labeling it  “the silent
majority” or “the moral majority” precisely in order to denigrate low-income people of
color and their liberal or radical partisans. Should the left be doing this as well? (Zweig
M., 2000). 9
30 And finally, it is important to understand what is wrong with a simple demonization of
the  1%.  That  is  a  politically  imprecise  category  as  well.  Most  in  that  1%  may  be
politically conservative and economically self-serving, while a prominent minority are
civic-minded liberals. But that is beside the point: the political significance of the 1% -
or as Paul Krugman and others point out, the .01% - is that these people comprise an
active  group  of  capitalists  whose  overweening  power  over  central  economic  and
political institutions is both the cause of our difficulties and the proper target of all
those who work for them, either directly in the corporations they control or in a public
sector starved by virtue of the political and financial power wielded by that same elite
stratum (Krugman P., 2019, A24). Taxing away their income by half would certainly free
up money for schools, infrastructure, health care and the like, but it would do little to
limit their power.
31 During the Great Depression, income inequality reached record lows, if only because
the value of the stocks and real estate held by the 1% of that era declined in precipitous
fashion.  But  we  do  not  remember  the  New  Deal  for  that.  Instead,  the  Roosevelt
Administration  and  the  social  movements  that  sustained  it  remain  a  hallmark  of
progressive  statecraft  because  it  helped  shift  the  structure  of  social  and  economic
power.  In  the  1930s  FDR  gave  many  speeches  that today  we  might  easily  label  as
populist.  In  his  famous  address  to  the  1936  Democratic  convention,  for  example,
Roosevelt denounced the “economic royalists” who had “carved new dynasties” based
upon their command of the giant corporations and powerful banks that emerged in the
20th century. He denounced “the privileged princes of these new economic dynasties,
thirsting for power, (who) reached out for control over Government itself. They created
a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction.” 10
32 Roosevelt  would  moderate this  rhetoric  during  World  War  II,  and  his  heirs,  like
Truman,  Stevenson,  Kennedy  and  Johnson,  never  offered  such  red  meat  to  the
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Democratic Party base. But FDR’s “populism” – and no observer then or later would
ever think of labeling his rhetoric with that word - had a multigenerational longevity
because it was backstopped, not only by new governmental laws and regulations, such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Fair Labor Standards Act, but by the
creation of institutions, most notably the powerful industrial unions, which organized
millions  of  employees  who worked for  corporations  that  stood at  the  commanding
heights of the national economy. These unions were mobilizing institutions whose very
existence was predicated upon a constant battle to limit the prerogatives of capital and
enhance the living standards of all those who exchanged labor for bread and shelter.
Thus, was populist rhetoric transformed into a social democratic political culture. 
33 Some old ideas remain valid and potent. For two centuries the rise of an organized
working  class  in  the  West  has  coincided  with  the  advance  of  a  democratic  polity.
Conversely, the demise of contemporary U.S. unionism – it  now stands at about six
percent in the private sector – means that not only is it much more difficult to raise
living standards, but that politics moves in an oligarchic and rightwing direction. The
industrial Midwest has swung toward the GOP during the last several years not because
there is  anything inherently rightwing about a population that is  more white,  blue
collar, and high school educated than in other states, but because the humbling of the
union movement in Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin and West Virginia has
gravely weakened a set of institutions that sustained Democratic Party strength and
social democratic values. In their place the door opens wide to resentment, resignation,
and atavistic, and authoritarian political leadership. 
34 Thus, we have witnessed the dramatic transformation of West Virginia from a bulwark
of Rooseveltian liberalism and working-class militancy to a right-to-work state of ruby
red  coloration.  This  shift  was  closely  linked  not  just  to  the  demise  of  its  historic
industries, but to the pulverization of a unionized workforce schooled by home grown
leaders seeking collective solutions to pressing social and economic problems. Union
density in West Virginia declined from above 30 percent in the early 1980s to about 12
percent  today,  one of  the  sharpest  drops  of  any  state.  Unemployment  in  the  state
remains  generally  higher  than the  national  average,  but  the  larger  problem is  the
substitution of low-wage, non-union service sector jobs for those of a much higher-
paying  and  dignified  character.  Mining  and  manufacturing  employment  dropped
precipitously  from  the  late  1980s  until  today,  while  retail  and  service  sector  jobs
offered a statistical,  if  not a substantive,  replacement.  Walmart,  for example,  is  the
state’s largest private sector employer, with almost 12,500 workers, about the same as
all the coal companies combined (American Friends Service Committee, 2013).11 
35 But it  is  not  just  a  question of  low wages.  In his  important book,  What Unions No
Longer Do, Jake Rosenfeld makes the case that the decline of unionism is responsible
for about one third of the overall  increase in U.S.  wage inequality among men and
about one fifth among women. But even more important, the near absence of unionism
among workers  who  stand  in  the  bottom half  of  the  private  sector  workforce  has
proven disastrous for political participation within this stratum (Rosenfeld J.,  2014).
Union members are at least 20 percent more likely to vote in presidential elections
than nonmembers and they are 43 percent more likely to volunteer in such a campaign.
Other studies have shown that  if  all  other variables  are held constant,  a  unionized
worker is about 15 percent more likely to vote Democratic than one not in a union. And
as Judith Stein pointed out  just  before  the 2016 election,  there are  just  two places
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where working class people, regardless of race, can get leadership skills in America: the
union and the church (Stein J., 2016). Both privilege loyalty, self-education, and organic
leadership over  formal  credentials  earned elsewhere.  The latter  flourishes  and tilts
right, certainly in its evangelical, mega-church version. The unions are having a harder
time, if only because their very existence is demonized and resisted by a huge majority
of all employers, both public as well as private. 
36 Policy initiatives like the “Fight for $15” that seek to raise wages and thereby reduce
income inequality are a good thing and widely popular in the contemporary U.S. But
such otherwise salutary campaigns for an improvement of U.S. labor standards – which
include sick leave, regular shifts, overtime pay, increases in the minimum wage – often
implemented through referenda, executive orders, and new ordnances and legislation –
are not a substitute for the revival of trade unionism. Without a revival of this bedrock
working-class institution, redistributive tax policy and progressive welfare programs
will always remain on shaky ground. 
37 Trade  unions  crystalize  and  institutionalize  working-class  sentiment  and  militancy.
Consciousness is episodic, public opinion and political commitments come and go, so
without an organization that includes a paid staff, recognized leadership, and steady
income, employers and their political allies know that they just have to wait a few years
for the energy and commitment of a movement like “The Fight for $15” to drain away,
after which inflation, technological change, and shifting consumption patterns will all
erode these social movement achievements. Conversely, the existence of a union, in
virtually any form or coloration, constitutes an institutional expression of the elevated
consciousness  of  those  who  in  a  moment  of  engagement actually  mobilized  their
workmates and built an organization to permanently represent that new ideological
and social understanding. Member dues pay for a staff whose task it is to continually
mobilize  the  membership,  recruit  new  ones,  and  confront  employer  and  state
opponents. If this appears to be an argument for bureaucracy and against spontaneity,
populist or otherwise, the reader is correct. 12
38 In the absence of a union revival – or really of any kind of progressive organization or
party that gives coherence to working-class fears and aspirations – we are condemned
to watch populist history repeat itself. On the left, tribunes like Sanders, and before
him John Edwards, Howard Dean, Ralph Nader, and Jesse Jackson will  come and go.
Meanwhile, on the right, populism of a far more retrograde sort makes steady headway
within an unorganized and increasingly alienated white working-class that in better
days gave its allegiance to a New Deal liberalism that stretched well into the postwar
era. These populisms, both on the left and the right, flourish in an episodic fashion
today because they are neither true protest movements, like that of civil rights and
feminism in their heyday, nor based upon political and social institutions that can exist
independent  of  the  feverish  campaign  season.  Not  surprisingly,  when  unions  and
union-oriented  Democrats  were  stronger  in  America,  such  populist  impulses  found
little purchase within the body politic. Should the labor movement stir again, inspiring
and channeling the social energy and anti-elite grievance so prevalent in our time, such
populisms will rapidly fade, and a good thing too. 
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ABSTRACTS
If in contemporary parlance “populism” stands for a social or political movement embodying
otherwise unorganized and atomized anti-elite sentiment, then trade unionism is not populist.
Labor  organizations  are  anti-elitist,  but  they  have  a  concrete  program,  a  sense  of  social
solidarity, a reasonably democratic leadership structure, and the capacity to exist once the fever
or  the  election  season  has  passed.  Little  of  this  is  true  of  political  campaigns  and  social
insurgencies, including those of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, which have played such a
prominent role in recent American life. A survey of some recent U.S. strikes, including those of
blue-collar  whites  in  heavy  industry  and  white-collar  teachers  of  multicultural  hue,
demonstrates the validity of this thesis. 
Si, dans le langage contemporain, le « populisme » représente un mouvement social ou politique
qui  incarne  un sentiment  anti-élite  non organisé  et  atomisé,  alors  le  syndicalisme n'est  pas
populiste. Les organisations syndicales sont anti-élitistes, mais elles ont un programme concret,
un sens de la solidarité sociale, une structure de leadership raisonnablement démocratique et la
capacité d'exister une fois la fièvre ou la saison électorale passée. Cela ne vaut guère pour les
campagnes  politiques  et  les  insurrections  sociales,  y  compris  celles  de  Bernie  Sanders  et  de
Donald Trump, qui ont joué un rôle si important dans la vie américaine récente. Un survol de
certaines grèves récentes aux États-Unis, y compris celles des cols bleus de l'industrie lourde et
des enseignants cols blancs de couleur multiculturelle, démontre la validité de cette thèse.
Si en el lenguaje contemporáneo el "populismo" representa un movimiento social o político que
encarna un sentimiento  antielite  no organizado y  atomizado,  entonces  el  sindicalismo no es
populista. Las organizaciones sindicales son antielitistas, pero tienen un programa concreto, un
sentido  de  solidaridad  social,  una  estructura  de  liderazgo  razonablemente  democrática  y  la
capacidad de existir una vez que haya pasado la fiebre o la temporada electoral. Poco de esto se
aplica a las campañas políticas y a las insurgencias sociales, incluidas las de Bernie Sanders y
Donald  Trump,  que  han  desempeñado  un  papel  tan  prominente  en  la  vida  estadounidense
reciente. Una encuesta de algunas huelgas recientes en Estados Unidos, incluyendo las de los
blancos  obreros  en  la  industria  pesada  y  las  de  los  maestros  obreros  de  tono  multicultural,
demuestra la validez de esta tesis. 
INDEX
Palabras claves: populismo, trabajo, huelgas, sindicatos, Sanders, Trump
Keywords: populism, labor, strikes, unions, Sanders, Trump
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